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. Introduction
At 11:40 on the morning of February 7, 1904, Chief Belt of the
Washington, D.C., Fire Department received a telegram from Baltimore.' The
telegram read, "Big fire here. Must have help at once." 2 At 12:06, a train
loaded with fire equipment pulled out of Washington and began the forty-mile
trip to Baltimore.3 The train arrived in Baltimore just thirty-one minutes later,
"probably the record for time between the two cities."'4 When the Washington
fire brigades went to work, however, they found that the couplings on their
hoses did not match the Baltimore hydrants, rendering the Washington
equipment useless.5 Help arrived from New York, Philadelphia, Annapolis,
Wilmington, and other towns, but the threads on their hoses also failed to
match the Baltimore hydrants.6 The fire burned for thirty hours and destroyed
more than seventy blocks of downtown Baltimore,7 while the assembled
1. See Made Record Run, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1904, at 2 (describing Washington's
response to the Baltimore fire).
2. Id.
3. See id. ("The fire apparatus was hastily loaded on the train, consisting of an engine, a
box car for the horses, and four flat cars, and at 12:06 it pulled out on its furious trip of forty
miles.").
4. Id.
5. See Compared with Chicago, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1904, at 9 ("'I notice[d] that when
the Washington engines arrived it was found that the [Baltimore] hydrant threads would not fit
the Washington apparatus."' (quoting ChiefMusham ofthe Chicago Fire department)); Notes of
Insurance Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1904, at 32 ("Many of the outside engines sent to
Baltimore were of no use because their couplings would not fit.").
6. Kenneth Turan, They've Got Their Standards, WASH. POST, July 20, 1975, at 11
("[Flire units from Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Annapolis, Wilmington, Chester,
York, Harrisburg, and even Altoona all stood around looking silly....").
7. Id. at 11 ("The end result was a thirty-hour fire in which 1,526 buildings, more than
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firefighters "stood around looking silly."8 "The glare of the conflagration forty
miles away was plainly visible in Washington."9
At the time of the blaze, fire protection groups had been advocating for the
installation of a standard size hose coupling. Chief Musham of the Chicago
Fire Department stated in the wake of the fire:
I notice[d] that when the Washington engines arrived it was found that the
[Baltimore] hydrant threads would not fit the Washington apparatus. It has
long been agitated that all cities should have threads the same size and
style, but each city insists that it has the best equipment and no progress is
made. 1
The disaster in Baltimore convinced American cities to standardize the size of
hydrant threads so that the hoses of one city would match the hydrants of
another." Today, standardization is everywhere. We take for granted that an
electrical plug will fit in a standardized outlet, that a new radio will receive
signals broadcast in a standardized format, or that a garden hose will fit the
spigot on the side of a house.' 2 It is only when standards are absent, as in the
Baltimore fire, that we become aware of how vital they are.
This Note will explore Congress's response to the continuing need for
standardization-the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of
1995 (NTTAA). 3 As of 1995, private standards-development organizations
(SDOs) set almost half of the standards in the United States.' 4 The NTTAA
requires all federal agencies to "use technical standards that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.., as a means to carry out
policy objectives or activities."' 5 It also requires that agencies "participate with
70 city blocks, were destroyed.").
8. Id. at 11.
9. Made Record Run, supra note 1, at 2.
10. See Compared with Chicago, supra note 5, at 9 (comparing the Baltimore fire of 1904
to the Chicago fire of 1871).
11. See For National Fire System, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1908, at 16 (describing how the
Baltimore fire convinced the Commissioner of Washington to consider the plan of the National
Fire Protection Association to obtain a uniform hose coupling).
12. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF
STANDARDS SETTING 1 (2004) [hereinafter ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING] (describing
the abundance of standards).
13. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) (encouraging cooperation in
research and development between the federal government and the private sector).
14. See ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 12, at 4 ("[T]he estimated
number of standards imposed by U.S. federal government agencies was approximately 52,000 in
1995, while the number of standards set by private entities was approximately 41,500.").
15. 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
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such bodies in the development of technical standards" when "such
participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency and
departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources."'
6
Congress's scheme, however, has created organizations that can persist, on the
one hand, unfettered by the constitutional restraints on state actors and, on the
other hand, with immunity from the laws that punish the anticompetitive
behavior of private actors. This Note argues that the NTTAA, by closely
allying agencies with SDOs, has placed SDOs in a legal no-man's-land, drifting
between the law controlling private organizations and the law controlling
government agencies. This situation cannot continue.
This Note examines the reasons behind the NTTAA's passage, its
susceptibility to abuse, and its position in a legal limbo. Part II begins by
laying out the processes employed by several of the most influential SDOs.17 It
concludes by discussing the legislative history of the NTTAA and the policy
decisions that spawned it. Part III evaluates whether the NTTAA's program is
susceptible to abuse. It addresses three arguments against government use of
private standards: first, the possibility that the government will exert too much
control over SDOs and thereby cancel out the benefits of private industry
participation; second, the fear that larger members of an industry will dominate
an SDO and prevent smaller members from fully participating in standards
development; and third, that industry members will ignore the public interest in
favor of industry interests. Part III concludes that, while the NTTAA and OMB
Circular A- 11918 attempt to ensure that SDOs will employ proper due process,
powerful groups-both private and governmental--can find ways to use SDOs
to their advantage.
Part IV discusses the potential constitutional and statutory issues with the
NTTAA: first, the possibility that an SDO may qualify as a state actor for
constitutional law purposes; second, that Congress has improperly delegated
power to private parties by adopting private standards for public use; and third,
that an SDO might be liable under antitrust law. This Part concludes that,
under current statutory and case law, SDOs fit neatly into a legal no-man's-
land, one favored and encouraged by Congress. SDOs exist in a murky limbo
between the public and private sectors. Although Congress employs SDOs for
public purposes, SDOs do not qualify as state actors and Congress did not
wrongfully delegate authority to them as semi-private, semi-public entities.
16. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 783.
17. This Note will use the term standards development organization (SDO). SDO is the
term employed by the OMB Circular A- 119. Infra note 31 and accompanying text. Some of the
literature on this subject will refer to SDOs as SSOs, or standards-setting organizations.
18. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining OMB Circular A- 119).
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Under antitrust law, however, SDOs reside on a higher plane than ordinary
commercial bodies. This elevated status limits an SDO's liability in antitrust
suits.
This Note concludes that the NTTAA has created a dangerous situation.
By pulling SDOs further away from the private sphere but refusing to pull them
completely into the public sphere, Congress has left SDOs floating in a void.
Here, the rules governing private actors have less effect, and the rules
governing public bodies have no effect. This situation cannot persist.
Consumers, workers, and the public deserve some way to oversee and second-
guess this public function.
IT The Modern Standards-Setting Process and the NTTAA
This Part discusses the history of standards-setting in America, provides a
brief description of three of the most influential SDOs, and describes the
legislative history of the NTTAA. One cannot understand the NTTAA without
some knowledge of the historical and political forces that spawned it.
A. A Brief History of Standards-Setting in the United States
With the explosion of mass production during the Industrial Revolution,
standardization became necessary to maintain efficiency. 19 "Railroad owners,
for example, had to choose between at least twenty different gauges of track."
20
In response, members of industry formed groups like the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM), founded in 1898, and the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), founded in 1918. 2 1  Another influential
organization established in this era was the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA).22 The NFPA, organized in 1896 to reduce fire risk, was the
organization that pushed for the development of a standardized hydrant
coupling after the Baltimore fire.23
19. Felicity Barringer, Setting Some Standards: Reagan Revisions Awaited, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 1981, at A25 ("The concept of standardization was born late in the Industrial
Revolution as an efficiency measure.").
20. Id.
21. See id. (stating that these groups were organized to ensure efficiency in the late
Industrial Revolution); see also Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 25 (1990) (listing the founding dates of different standards
organizations).
22. See CHEIT, supra note 21, at 25 (stating the founding date of the NFPA).
23. See For National Fire System, supra note 11, at 16 ("To obtain a uniform hose
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Today, the United States has over 600 organizations developing
standards24 and about 93,000 active standards. 25 Although the standards set by
these organizations are voluntary, governments at the local, state, and federal
levels incorporate the standards into law.26 Because of the private origin of
standards organizations in this country, the United States, unlike most foreign
governments, "did not feel the need to develop a centralized, government-run
standards system. ,27 The federal government, however, participates in the
standards-setting process, both as a purchaser of private standards and as a
creator of its own standards.28
Federal agencies employ standards to perform their vast array of duties.
29
A turning point in the way agencies employ standards occurred when the
Reagan administration encouraged agencies to rely on private standards in lieu
of spending the time and money developing their own.3 ° In 1982, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) promulgated Circular A- 119,31 requiring
federal agencies to adopt and use standards developed by voluntary consensus
coupling by fire departments of large cities, Commissioner Macfarland has under consideration
the plans of the National Fire Protection Association; the aims of which are to have installed a
standard size coupling .... ").
24. See KRISTA JOHNSEN & NEVILLE PUGH, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
GUIDELINES FOR NIST STAFF PARTICIPATING IN VOLUNTARY STANDARDS DEVELOPING
ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES, app. C, at 14 (2002), available at http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/
Conformity/upload/ir6778.pdf ("There are more than 600 organizations... in the United States
that develop voluntary standards.").
25. See id. ("At the national level, the United States currently maintains about 93,000
standards in an active status.").
26. See Barringer, supra note 19, at A25 ("While the standards are voluntary, many
become incorporated in state and local laws, such as building safety codes. ANSI's Bill
Rockwell estimates 75 percent of that group's safety standards have become mandatory
somewhere.").
27. JOHNSEN & PUGH, supra note 24, at 13.
28. See id. at 16 ("The Federal Government itself is directly concerned with setting and
implementing standards through legislation, regulation, or contractual obligations for sales to
government purchasers.").
29. For a helpful discussion of agency use of standards, see CHEIT, supra note 21, at 29-
31.
30. See id. at 8 (noting President Reagan's "effort to increase public use of private
standards").
31. Office of Management and Budget Circular A- 119, Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment
Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998) [hereinafter OMB Circular A-1 19] (requiring
federal agencies to adopt and use standards developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies
and to work closely with those organizations to ensure that the developed standards are
consistent with agency needs).
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standards bodies.32 On the advice of the Vice-President of the United States
and the general counsel of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
33
Congress passed the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA) 3 4 -the subject of this Note. In brief, the NTTAA instructs federal
agencies to incorporate privately created standards into public law.
B. The Standards-Setting Process
Because of the large number of SDOs, 35 there are a variety of ways that
SDOs develop standards.36 To show how SDOs create standards, this Note
describes the processes of three of the most influential SDOs: the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM), and the National Fire Protection Associations (NFPA).
Together, these three organizations have developed approximately 11,712
active standards.37
1. American National Standards Institute
ANSI is unique among SDOs because it does not actually write
standards.38 It acts as "an overall coordinator and certifier of the... voluntary
national standards system."39 Other SDOs, which are accredited by ANSI,
32. H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 25 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493, 511
("OMB Circular A- 119 was originally promulgated in 1982 and revised in 1993. It requires
federal agencies to adopt and use standards, developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
and to work closely with these organizations to ensure that developed standards are consistent
with agency needs.").
33. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 518 (summarizing the words of the Vice
President and General Counsel of ANSI suggesting that OMB Circular A-119 needs
congressional backing to be effective).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000) (encouraging cooperation in research and development
between the Federal Government and the private sector).
35. See JOHNSEN & PUGH, supra note 24, at 14 ("There are more than 600
organizations... in the United States that develop voluntary standards.").
36. See CHEIT, supra note 21, at 25-28 (profiling ten SDOs).
37. See JOHNSEN & PUGH, supra note 24, at 15 tbl.1 (listing the twenty American SDOs
that developed approximately 80% of American standards and explaining how many standards
each SDO has developed).
38. See CHEIT, supra note 21, at 26 (stating that ANSI is unique among SDOs because it
does not write standards).
39. Id.
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submit their standards to ANSI for approval as American National Standards.4°
To achieve accreditation from ANSI, organizations must meet certain
procedural requirements.41 Anyone who objects to the approval of a standard
42may appeal to ANSI's Board of Standards Review. 42 ANSI's members are
principally industry representatives and other standards-setting organizations.43
2. American Society for Testing and Materials
ASTM is more representative of most SDOs than ANSI because ATSM
relies on volunteer committees to write its standards. 44 The committees then
submit these standards for approval by ASTM's approximately thirty thousand
members.45 ASTM's mission statement is "[t]o be the foremost developer and
provider of voluntary consensus standards, related technical information, and
services having globally recognized quality and applicability., 46 It develops
standards "on characteristics and performance of materials, products, systems,
and services., 47 With a desire to be the "foremost developer" of standards, it is
40. See id. ("Other organizations, including ANSI committees-groups 'accredited' by
ANSI-submit their standards for approval as American National Standards.").
41. See id. ("The requirements for ANSI certification... are essentially procedural, not
substantive.").
42. See id. at 26 ("The Board of Standards Review hears complaints from anyone who
objects to certification of a 'national consensus standard.' Appeals are infrequent, except in the
area of 'health and safety."').
43. See id. ("ANSI's membership consists of industry representatives and standards-
setting organizations ... ').
44. Id. at27.
45. Id.
46. Mission Statement of the American Society for Testing and Materials,
http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/NEWS/Mission2.html?L+mystore+svkv3724+11949
31128 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The full
Mission Statement reads:
To be the foremost developer and provider of voluntary consensus standards,
related technical information, and services having globally recognized quality and
applicability that: promote public health and safety, and the overall quality of life;
contribute to the reliability of materials, products, systems and services; and
facilitate international, regional, and national commerce.
Id.
47. CHEIT, supra note 21, at 27.
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no surprise to find that ASTM is the rival organization of ANSI. 48 In fact,
"ASTM no longer submits its standards for certification [by ANSI].
49
3. National Fire Protection Associations
The NFPA is the most influential fire safety SDO in the United States.
The NFPA publishes its standards as codes, several of which have been
adopted directly into law in many local jurisdictions. 50 Several federal agencies
also reference NFPA standards. 51 The NFPA's structure is similar to that of the
ASTM. Volunteer technical committees write the organization's codes and
standards, and the membership then votes on those standards at semi-annual
conventions. 52 The NFPA has over thirty-two thousand members, including
firefighters, engineers, manufacturers, insurance representatives, laborers, and
government workers.53
C. Legislative History
Congress passed the NTTAA in 1995. 54 While the bulk of the NTTAA
focuses on the relationship between federal and private laboratories,55 Section
12 focuses on voluntary consensus technical standards, the kind set by SDOs.
56
48. See id. ("ANSI has long been an organizational rival of ASTM's. The organizations
trade allegations of 'turf grabbing,' ... .
49. Id.
50. See id. at 28 (describing the influence of the NFPA's codes). The NFPA's best-
known code is the National Electric Code. Id.
51. See id. ("Various NFPA standards are referenced by [the Occupational Safety and
Health Act] OSHA, the Coast Guard, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.").
52. See id. at 28 (describing the organization of the NFPA).
53. See id. (describing the membership of the NFPA); Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n, Technical
Committee List (2007), http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/CodesStandards/NFPATC
List07O7.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (listing the name and organization affiliation of each
member of the NFPA's technical committees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
54. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) (encouraging cooperation in
research and development between the federal government and the private sector).
55. See id. §§ 2-9, 110 Stat. at 775-79 (allowing employees of federal laboratories to
receive patent licenses for inventions produced as a result of collaboration between federal and
private laboratories, while allowing the federal government to retain the right to use the
invention free of charge).
56. See id. § 12, 110 Stat. at 782-83 (requiring federal agencies to consult private
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Section 12 requires all federal agencies to "use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. . . as a means
to carry out policy objectives or activities. 57 The NTTAA also instructs
agencies to "participate with such bodies in the development of technical
standards" when "such participation is in the public interest and is compatible
with agency and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget
resources." 58 If an agency elects not to use a standard created by an SDO, the
head of the agency must submit to the OMB the agency's reasons for choosing
the government-developed standard over the SDO's standard.59
Section 12 of the NTTAA codifies the OMB Circular A- 1 19,60 which the
OMB originally promulgated in 1982.61 In many places, the language of the
Circular is nearly identical to that of the NTTAA's Section 12.62 The House of
Representatives felt that OMB Circular A-i 19 needed this congressional
backing because, up to 1995, "the federal record with regard to the use of
voluntary consensus standards [was] mixed, at best.,
63
voluntary consensus standards and, when use of such standards is compatible with agency goals
and budgets, to use them in lieu of government-created standards).
57. Id. § 12(d)(l), 110 Stat. at 783.
58. Id. § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 783.
59. See id. § 12(d)(3), 110 Stat. at 783 ("[A] federal agency or department may elect to
use technical standards that are not developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards
bodies if the head of each such agency or department transmits to the Office of Management and
Budget an explanation of the reasons for using such standards."). For examples of agencies'
reasons for adopting government-unique standards in place of voluntary consensus standards,
see generally KEViN L. MCINTYRE & MICHAEL B. MOORE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, app. C (2005), available at http://standards.gov/NTrAA/resources/
nttaaar_2004.pdf.
60. OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 24-25 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493,
511 (stating that the NTTAA codifies OMB Circular A- 119).
62. Compare OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8553 (directing agencies "to use
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards except where
inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical"), with National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) (stating that "all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives," unless doing so "is
inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical").
63. H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 25; see also id. at 30-31 (stating that, during a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Technology held in June of 1995, Amy Marasco, the Vice
President and General Counsel of the American National Standards Institute, reinforced the
position that the Circular needed statutory backing to be effective).
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In the House Report accompanying the NTTAA, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Science announced its intent to "make private
sector-developed consensus standards the rule, rather than the exception." 64
The Committee's goal was to "reduce duplication and waste by effectively
integrating the federal government and private sector resources in the voluntary
consensus standards system, while protecting its industry-driven nature and the
public good., 65 The Committee hoped that Section 12 of the NTTAA would
help the government accomplish this end by "phasing out the use of federally-
developed standards wherever possible, in favor of standards developed by
private sector, consensus standards organizations.
66
Congress and the Executive Branch have many reasons to favor standards
developed by SDOs over government-produced standards. Obviously, it is
generally cheaper for the government to buy a private standard than to dedicate
the time, money, and labor necessary to develop its own. 67  Also, by
participating in the SDOs as directed by the NTTAA 68 and OMB Circular A-
119,69 agencies help ensure that the standards developed by SDOs fit each
agency's needs.7 ° In addition, using an SDO to develop a standard allows
agencies to "benefit from the expertise of the private sector."'
64. Id. at 25.
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., William P. Boswell & James P. Cargas, North American Energy Standards
Board: Legal and Administrative Underpinnings of a Consensus Based Organization, 27
ENERGY L.J. 147, 165 (2006) (stating that the utilization of private standards favored by OMB
Circular A- 119 would eliminate the cost to the government of developing its own standards).
But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DuKE L.J. 389, 406-11
(2003) (arguing that because of transaction costs such as opportunistic behavior,
incompleteness, and hold-up, it is often cheaper for the government to develop a standard itself
than to outsource standards-setting to private SDOs).
68. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) ("Federal
agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards
bodies and shall, when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency
and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources, participate with such
bodies in the development of technical standards.").
69. OMB Circular A-1 19, supra note 31, at 8555-56.
70. See id. at 8546 (announcing that the policies of OMB Circular A- 119 are intended to,
among other things, promote federal agency participation in SDOs to ensure creation of
standards that are usable by the agencies). But see Shapiro, supra note 67, at 406-07 (arguing
that industry representatives tend to produce standards that reflect the self-interest of the
corporations for which they work, while neglecting the public interest).
71. OMB Circular A-1 19, supra note 31, at 8546.
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During Senate deliberations on the NTTAA, some senators focused on a
more precise definition of "voluntary consensus standards bodies" found in the
OMB Circular A-i 1 9.72 Today, for an SDO to qualify as a voluntary consensus
standards body under the Circular, it must have the following attributes:
openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals process, and consensus
(which the Circular defines as general agreement).73 In other words, "a
legitimate consensus standards organization provides [an] open process in
which all parties and experts have ample opportunity to participate in
developing the consensus. 74 This definition requires any private consensus
standard adopted by an agency to be the product of equal participation by all
members of an industry. While the system outlined by the NTTAA sounds
useful and its emphasis on due process and consensus is noble, the NTTAA
contains serious flaws.
III. The NTTAA 's Scheme Is Susceptible to Abuse
This Part establishes that, under the NTTAA's scheme, members of SDOs
can abuse the organizations to further their own interests. With this potential
for abuse, the lack of outside controls pointed out in Part IV is even more
troubling. Administrative law scholars who have examined privatization of
legislative functions seem to agree on three concerns that arise in situations
such as the one implemented under the NTTAA. First, the government might
72. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S1078, S1081 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Rockefeller) (commenting on the standards-setting process). Senator Rockefeller explained:
[Voluntary consensus standard bodies] are established explicitly for the purpose of
developing such standards through a process having three characteristics-First,
openness, defined as meaning that participation in the standards development
process shall be open to all persons who are directly and materially affected by the
activity in question; second, balance of interest, which means that the consensus
body responsible for the development of a standard shall be comprised of
representatives of all categories or interest that relate to the subject ... and third,
due process, which means a procedure by which any individual or organization who
believes that an action or inaction of a third party causes unreasonable hardship or
potential harm is provided the opportunity to have a fair hearing of their concerns.
Id. The current version of the OMB Circular A- 119 adds two more characteristics to this
definition: an appeals process and consensus. OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8554.
73. See OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8554 ("A voluntary consensus standards
body is defined by the following attributes: (i) Openness. (ii) Balance of interest. (iii) Due
Process. (iv) An appeals process. (v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but
not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections by
interested parties .... ").
74. 142 CONG. REC. at S 1081 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
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exert too much control over the SDOs and, by doing so, cancel out the benefits
of private industry participation.75 Second, larger members of the industry
could dominate SDOs and prevent smaller segments of the industry from
participating in standards development.76 Third, industry representatives in
SDOs could ignore the public interest in favor of industry interests when setting
standards."
A. Fear of Government Domination
When the revised version of OMB Circular A- 119 (the version that
incorporates the NTTAA) underwent notice and comment, some commentators
were concerned that federal government participants would dominate SDOs.7s
The OMB noted that commentators
urged additional limitations on agency participation in voluntary consensus
standards bodies, including: Prohibiting federal agency representatives
from chairing committees or voting... ; having only an advisory role;
participating only if directly related to an agency's mission or statutory
authority; and participating only if there is an opportunit for a third party
challenge to the participation through a public hearing.
In response, the OMB pointed out safeguards in the text of the Circular
intended to prevent such domination. For example, Section 7(g) directs
agency employees to avoid the appearance of undue influence within SDOs."
The same section also instructs that "[a]gency representatives must not
75. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv.
L. REv. 1285, 1288-89 (2003) (expressing concern that "administrative law would try to
squelch" the potential benefits of using private actors to serve public goals).
76. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the
Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REv.
1329, 1380-81 (1978) (concluding that small businesses are not adequately represented in the
voluntary standards organizations that write nongovernmental standards affecting safety and
health).
77. See id. at 1382-83 (discussing the sparse representation of labor and consumer
interests in the standards-setting process).
78. See OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8548 ("Several commentators... remain
concerned that an agency member might dominate a voluntary consensus standards body,...
thus making the process not truly consensus.").
79. Id.
80. See id. at 8549 (describing the language in the final circular that clarifies the role of
agency representatives in SDOs).
81. See id. at 8556 ("[A]gency employees must avoid the practice or the appearance of
undue influence relating to their agency representation and activities in voluntary consensus
standards bodies.").
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (2008)
dominate such bodies, and in any case are bound by voluntary consensus
standards bodies' rules and procedures, including those regarding domination
of proceedings by an individual., 82
The OMB refrained from imposing specific limitations on agency
participation in SDOs that would result in "unequal participation relative to
other members" because it "decided that such limitations would (1) not further
the purposes of the [NTTAA] and (2) could interfere with the internal
operations of [SDOs]. 83 The intent of the NTTAA, according to the OMB,
was to encourage agencies to participate fully and equally in SDOs. 84 The
OMB chose to leave the internal management of the SDOs to the SDOs
themselves because "it would be inappropriate for the federal government to
direct the internal operations of private sector [SDOs] by proscribing the
activities of any of its members," including the activities of agency
representatives. 85 An SDO is free to elect an agency representative as chair, to
establish its own voting procedures, and to accept federal funding as it deems
appropriate. 86  The OMB expects an SDO to police itself and protect its
credibility by ensuring that its proceedings are fair.87
Although the OMB's reasons for declining to regulate an agency's level of
participation in an SDO have merit, the allure of attracting federal funds and
the fear of losing them is likely to influence an SDO's decisions. The OMB
Circular allows agencies to increase agency funding to SDOs when "it is in the
direct and predominant interest of the Government to develop or revise a
standard, and its timely development or revisions appears [sic] unlikely in the
absence of such support., 88 Just as the federal government induces states to
conform to federal goals through its spending power,89 federal agencies have
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8549.
84. See id. ("[T]he Act was intended to promote full and equal participation in [SDOs] by
federal agencies.").
85. Id.
86. See id. ("The membership of an SDO is free to choose a chair, to establish voting
procedures, and to accept funding as deemed appropriate.").
87. See id. ("We expect that the SDO itself or a related parent or accrediting organization
would act to ensure that the organization's proceedings remain fair and balanced. An SDO has
a vested interest in ensuring that its consensus procedures and policies are followed in order to
maintain its credibility.").
88. Id. at 8556.
89. See Freeman, supra note 75, at 1285 (comparing the use of the federal government's
spending power to induce state conformity to federal goals with the use of government funds to
induce adherence to public norms in private firms); see also STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH &
MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE 173 (1993) ("[N]onprofits all too often have had their
programming priorities dictated by funding agencies.").
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the ability, authorized and encouraged by the NTTAA, to influence the actions
of SDOs. The NTTAA gives SDOs an incentive to create standards that meet
the political goals of agency officials. Whether the loss of this independence is
ultimately good for the public will be discussed later, but with the power of the
purse, agencies are able to influence the behavior and decision-making process
within SDOs.
B. Fear of Large Businesses Dominating the Standards-Setting Process
As the discussion of antitrust implications in Part IV.C of this Note will
reveal, larger, more powerful members of an industry can dominate SDO
proceedings at the expense of smaller and weaker participants. During one of
the hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology, which preceded the
NTTAA's passage, members of the business community testified that the
standards development process discriminated against small business. 90 Small
businesses often lack the time, money, and workforce necessary to send
representatives across the country to participate in various SDO meetings. 9'
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), for example, held thirteen
committee meetings in February 2007.92 The meetings took place in twelve
different cities, including Phoenix, San Antonio, Las Vegas, Little Rock,
Kansas City, Orlando, Atlanta, and Romulus, Michigan.93 In 2006, the
Boiler Combustion System Hazards Committee of the NFPA, a committee of
twenty-seven members from across the country responsible for "documents
on the reduction of combustion system hazards in single- and multiple-burner
boilers, 94 had an especially busy four months. The committee had one
90. See H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 31 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493,518
(summarizing the testimony of Walter Poggi, President of Retlif Testing Laboratories and
representative of the American Council of Independent Laboratories).
91. See Hamilton, supra note 76, at 1380 (stating that the cost of traveling to SDO
meetings across the country, which was "a necessary incident to active participation in the
standards development process," kept small businesses from actively participating in the major
SDOs).
92. See Coming Events, Committee Calendar, NFPA NEWS (Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n,
Quincy, Mass.), Jan. 2007, at 6, available at http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/NFPA%20
News/nfpanews0107.pdf (listing the committee meetings planned for February 2007).
93. See id. (listing the location of each of the meetings planned for February 2007).
94. See Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n, Technical Committee Members 40-41 (2007),
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/CodesStandards/NFPATCListl OO5.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007) (listing the name and organization affiliation of each member
of the Boiler Combustion System Hazards Committee and the scope of the
Committee's duties).
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conference in Orlando, Florida, on March 9-10, a second in Tampa,
Florida, on March 20-24, and a third in Norwood, Massachusetts, on June
14-15. 95 During the same period, the NFPA held its biggest event, the
World Safety Conference and Exposition, in Orlando, Florida on June 4-
8.96 It would be difficult for a small businessperson, especially one from
the West Coast, to spend the time and money necessary to attend each of
these meetings. These financial barriers against small businesses increase
opportunities for the interests of large corporations to dominate SDOs,
especially at the technical committee level where the standards are actually
written.97
If a powerful business has close ties to an SDO, it can use its position to
injure less influential competitors. In American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. ,98 the Supreme Court addressed such a
situation. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) sets a
"Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code," which, at the time of the case, was adopted
by forty-six states and all but one of the Canadian provinces. 99 One part of this
code sets standards for "low-water fuel cutoffs."100 "If the water in a boiler
drops below a level sufficient to moderate the boiler's temperature, the boiler
can 'dry fire' or even explode."10' Low-water fuel cutoffs automatically block
the fuel supply to the boiler when the water reaches a certain level.
0 2
McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M) had dominated the market for low-water fuel
cutoffs, but Hydrolevel Corp. attempted to break into the market with a slightly
different version of the device. 10 3  Unlike M&M's cutoff, Hydrolevel's
95. See Coming Events, Committee Calendar, NFPA NEWS (Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n,
Quincy, Mass.), Mar. 2006, at 9-10, available at http://nfpa.org/assets/files/1PDF/NFPA%20
News/nfpanews03O6.pdf (listing the committee meetings planned for 2006).
96. See id. at 10 (listing the date and location of the NFPA World Safety Conference and
Exposition).
97. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (describing the organization of the
NFPA and its technical committee system).
98. See Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 577 (1982)
(holding the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) liable for antitrust violations
of its agents committed with apparent authority).
99. Id. at 559.
100. See id. ("Section IV of the code sets forth standards for components of heating boilers,
including 'low-water fuel cutoffs."').
101. Id.
102. See id. ("A low-water fuel cutoff does what its name implies: when the water in the
boiler falls below a certain level, the device blocks the flow of fuel to the boiler before the water
level reaches a dangerously low point.").
103. Id. at 560.
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included a time delay.' °4 When one of M&M's long-time customers switched
to Hydrolevel's product, M&M looked for a way to protect itself from further
losses to Hydrolevel. 0 5 Luckily for M&M, one of its vice presidents served as
vice chairman of the subcommittee that drafted, revised, and interpreted the
section of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code governing low-water cutoffs.' 0
6
This vice president and other M&M officials met with the chairman of the
subcommittee and came up with a scheme, which resulted in the subcommittee
announcing that Hydrolevel's time delay device was unsafe. 10 7 M&M quickly
used this announcement to discourage potential customers from buying
Hydrolevel's product by telling them the device failed to satisfy ASME's
code. 108 Hydrolevel suffered market resistance for several years before
discovering the scheme. 09 Although SDOs hold dear the ideals of balance and
consensus," 0 stories like the Hydrolevel case and others"' demonstrate that
abuse of the SDO system by powerful members of an industry is a reality.
C. Fear of Industry Representatives Ignoring the Public Interest in Favor of
Industry Interests
Part III.B established that large businesses can dominate SDOs to the
detriment of smaller companies. This subpart discusses the potential for an
industry to exploit its position within an SDO to the detriment of the public
interest. The fear of private parties entrusted with public duties ignoring the
public interest in pursuit of selfish goals fascinates privatization scholars."
2
104. See id. ("The relevant distinction, for the purposes of this case, was that Hydrolevel's
fuel cutoff, unlike M&M's, included a time delay.").
105. See id. ("In early 1971, Hydrolevel secured an important customer. Brooklyn Union
Gas Company, which had purchased M&M's product for several years, decided to switch to
Hydrolevel's probe. Not surprisingly, M&M was concerned.").
106. See id. (describing the organization of ASME and M&M's advantageous position
within ASME).
107. See id. at 561-62 (describing M&M's plan to discredit Hydrolevel's product).
108. See id. at 562 ("As anticipated, M&M seized upon this interpretation of Section 1V to
discourage customers from buying Hydrolevel's product. It instructed its salesmen to tell
potential customers that Hydrolevel's fuel cutoff failed to satisfy ASME's code.").
109. See id. at 563-64 (describing Hydrolevel's troubles, ASME's failure to discover any
wrongdoing, and the Senate subcommittee that uncovered the scheme).
110. See Robert W. Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of
Regulatory Standards, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 455, 462-63 (1983) (describing the fundamental
concepts of balance and consensus required by SDOs in their standards development process).
111. See, e.g., infra notes 231-43 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988)).
112. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government
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Professor Sydney A. Shapiro has concluded that allowing SDOs to write
standards "invites opportunistic behavior by the [SDO], which can seek to
exploit its superior access to the information to serve its own self-interest.""
' 13
When an industry has the power to set its own rules, those rules will likely
benefit the industry. One anonymous government standards expert told a
Washington Post reporter in 1981: "[SDOs] generally develop standards that
address the needs of their members rather than the needs of consumers."' 
14
Shapiro similarly argues that "industry representatives tend to dominate
decisionmaking in many nonprofit organizations, and the standards that are
produced tend to reflect the self-interest of the corporations for whom the
participants work. '115 He notes that some of the SDO-produced standards
adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) "provide limited
protection for workers in many cases, because industry-dominated committees
are more reluctant than OSHA to characterize a substance as a carcinogen, and
less likely to rely on published scientific data instead of industry-supplied
information.""16
Professor Robert W. Hamilton suggests that labor and consumers lack
appropriate representation on SDO committees. 117 In some areas, unionized
labor participates fully on SDO committees, lI8 but in others, unions have
chosen to remain outside SDOs for ideological and financial reasons.!19 The
wide spectrum of consumer viewpoints makes effective representation within
SDOs difficult. "The consumer view is really a whole panoply of viewpoints
Functions, 84 N.C. L. REv. 397,405 (2006) (discussing whether "public law controls, such as
oversight and accountability," come with delegations to private parties).
113. Shapiro, supra note 67, at 408.
114. See Barringer, supra note 19, at A25 (quoting a government standards expert who
asked not to be identified).
115. Shapiro, supra note 67, at 407.
116. Id.at 408.
117. See Hamilton, supra note 76, at 1380-83 (concluding that small businesses, labor, and
the consumer are not adequately represented in the voluntary standards organizations).
118. See id. at 1382 (citing full participation by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers on each of the panels of the NFPA National Electrical Code Committee).
119. See id. (giving four reasons that unions have chosen not to participate in SDOs).
Hamilton suggests that, first, unions have "traditionally concentrated on bread-and-butter
economic issues and handled noneconomic issues through the political process." Id. Second,
"most unions lack the technical resources to engage in widespread voluntary standards setting."
Id. Third, "unions view the resolution of controversies within [SDOs] as completely controlled
by 'management.' To submit to a process in which they can be outvoted is anathema to the
labor movement in whose eyes labor's vote should balance management's." Id. Fourth and
finally, "some union officials fear that participation by labor under these circumstances gives a
legitimacy to the voluntary standards process to which it is not entitled." Id. at 1382-83.
Hamilton argues that organized labor prefers to rely on OSHA for protection. Id. at 1383.
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on a specific issue; for example, one consumer wants inexpensive products,
another wants safe products, and a third wants a particular mixture of the
two.""20 Additionally, "few public interest, environmental, or consumer groups
possess either the technical capacity or the resources to participate [in the
standards development process]."' 121 It is cost prohibitive for a small-scale
consumer to participate directly in the standards-setting process. 22 SDOs have
made efforts to incorporate consumers, including creating "Consumer Sounding
Boards" and utilizing consumer representatives on technical committees.
123
When government agencies participate in SDOs as instructed by the
NTTAA, 124 agency representatives should try to protect the public interest.
Whether those representatives do so, however, is not clear.
The financial structure of most SDOs also raises concerns. Other than the
money they may receive from agencies, SDOs derive most of their income from
the sale of their publications, while a smaller portion comes from member
dues. 25 This system of funding is similar to the system that the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)-an SDO-used prior to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.126 "The FASB received its funding from the FAF [a
nonprofit organization that was responsible for selecting the members of the
FASB and ensuring adequate funding of their activities], which derived more
than two-thirds of its monies from subscriptions and sales of FASB
publications and about one-third from voluntary contributions."'127 During the
Enron hearings, congressional witnesses sharply criticized this funding
120. Id.
121. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,647
(2000).
122. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (describing the financial barriers that
prevent small businesses from fully participating in the standards-setting process).
123. See Hamilton, supra note 76, at 1384-85 (describing the efforts of SDOs to include
consumer interests in their standards development processes).
124. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
113, § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) ("Federal
agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards
bodies and shall, when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency
and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources, participate with such
bodies in the development of technical standards.").
125. See Hamilton, supra note 110, at 461 ("The major source of ASTM's income is the
sale of its publications; dues provide only about one-fifth of its annual income .... ").
126. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCA OB and
Its Public/Private Status, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 988 (2005) ("The FASB received its
funding from the FAF, which derived more than two-thirds of its monies from subscriptions and
sales of FASB publications and about one-third from voluntary contributions.").
127. Id.
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structure. This criticism described the FASB as "'less than optimally
independent or objective' because 'it constantly place[d] FASB and FAF in the
role of a hat-in-hand supplicant soliciting the industry for charity.""
129
Although FASB is not identical to all SDOs, the fact that Congress denounced
FASB's funding system and completely reorganized it in 2002130 should cast
some doubt on the way similarly structured SDOs receive funds.
This Part has attempted to establish that there is significant room for abuse
within SDOs despite all of the discussion of openness, balance of interests, due
process, appeals, and consensus found in the OMB Circular' 3' and in the
internal rules of SDOs themselves. 32 The OMB hoped that the internal
regulations of SDOs would be sufficient to ensure due process: "We expect
that the SDO itself or a related parent or accrediting organization would act to
ensure that the organization's proceedings remain fair and balanced. An SDO
has a vested interest in ensuring that its consensus procedures and policies are
followed in order to maintain its credibility."'133 However, professionalism of
this kind, as "an informal accountability mechanism,. .. is invisible from a
traditional administrative law perspective."' 134  Additionally, this Part has
demonstrated that professionalism has failed in the past to guarantee fairness
within SDOs. There must be an external check on the internal procedure of
SDOs. Part IV will conclude that no adequate check currently exists.
128. See id. ("This funding mechanism drew sharp criticism from congressional witnesses
during the Enron hearings .... ").
129. See id. ("This funding mechanism drew sharp criticism from congressional witnesses
during the Enron hearings, who testified that it caused FASB to be 'less than optimally
independent or objective' because 'it constantly place[d] FASB and FAF in the role of a hat-in-
hand supplicant soliciting the industry for charity."' (quoting The Financial Accounting
Standards Board Act: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 52 (2002)
(prepared statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia
University Law School))).
130. See id. at 988-89 ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act... provid[ed] the FASB with the same
source of guaranteed funding it accorded to the PCAOB: public companies are required to pay
'annual accounting support fees' to fund both boards' operations.").
131. See OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8554 ("A voluntary consensus standards
body is defined by the following attributes: (i) Openness. (ii) Balance of interest. (iii) Due
process. (vi) An appeals process. (v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement .... ).
132. See Hamilton, supra note 110, at 461 (describing the process that American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) uses in its standards-development). ASTM employs
balanced committees and subcommittees comprised of representatives with different interests, a
central staff to monitor the work of the committees, and an appeals process to ensure
compliance with procedures. Id.
133. OMB Circular A-1 19, supra note 31, at 8549.
134. Freeman, supra note 121, at 643.
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IV. SDOs' Position in a Legal Limbo
Part III concluded that professionalism alone is insufficient to ensure that
SDOs will employ due process in their standards-setting. There must be some
outside check on SDOs, therefore, to make certain that the organizations
actually utilize procedures through which all interested parties have a voice.
This Part establishes that, because of a combination of constitutional law
principles, judicial interpretation, and congressional action, no adequate outside
check exists. Such an external check could come from three sources. This
Note considers each in turn. First, increased government participation and
public funding of SDOs raises the possibility that an SDO can qualify as a state
actor and become subject to the due process and equal protection requirements
of the Constitution.1 35 Second, because the NTTAA delegates governmental
functions to private organizations, it may violate the nondelegation doctrine and
therefore be unconstitutional. 36  Third, because members of SDOs have
"economic incentives to restrain competition,"'137 SDOs are subject to liability
under antitrust laws. 138 However, recent statutes and increased federal
participation in SDOs, as mandated by the NTTAA, may alter the extent of that
antitrust liability. This Part concludes that none of these possible mechanisms
provides an adequate external check on SDOs.
A. Is an SDO, Under the NTTAA, a State Actor?
Under the NTTAA and OMB Circular A-1 19, federal agencies are to
participate as members of SDOs in the standards-making process. 139 OMB
135. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) ("[S]tate action may be found if... there is such a 'close nexus between the State
and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself."' (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974))).
136. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 112, at 433-36 (discussing the nondelegation issues
raised by private standards-setting).
137. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
138. The Supreme Court has twice found SDOs in violation of antitrust laws. See Allied
Tube, 486 U.S. at 495 (affirming jury damages to the plaintiff upon finding that antitrust
laws applied to the NFPA and that the actions of several steel conduit manufacturers violated
those antitrust laws when they recruited over 200 people to vote against a standard the
manufacturers did not want passed at an Association meeting); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs,
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1982) (affirming jury damages to the
plaintiff because the SDO was liable under the antitrust laws for antitrust violations
committed by its agents).
139. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
113, § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) (instructing
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (2008)
Circular A- 119 allows agencies to assist SDOs by giving financial and
administrative support, by cooperating in joint planning, and by allowing the
participation of agency personnel. 140  In 2004, there were 3,208 agency
employees participating in SDOs. 141  With this level of government
participation in SDO standards-making, one wonders if SDOs have become so
entwined with agency funds and personnel that they are more similar to state
actors than the private organizations they were founded to be.
1. State Actor Implications
If SDOs qualified as state actors, courts would hold them to the high
constitutional standard applicable to federal and state governments. 14  State
actors are required to respect First Amendment rights to free speech and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process. 143  The
Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over "all Cases... arising under
this Constitution."'144 If SDOs qualified as state actors, then a person who felt
that an SDO denied him due process or improperly set a standard that
wrongfully excluded his product could bring a claim against the SDO.
Although such vulnerability would inevitably slow the standards-making
process, it would allow for an outside check on the inner-workings of SDOs.
agencies to participate in the development of technical standards); OMB Circular A- 119, supra
note 31, at 8555-56 (requiring agencies to participate with SDOs when participation is in the
public interest and compatible with agency missions and budget resources, and setting out
guidelines for such participation).
140. See OMB Circular A-i 19, supra note 31, at 8556 (stating that agency support may
include direct financial support in the form of grants or memberships; administrative support in
the form of travel costs or hosting meetings; technical support, including participation of agency
personnel in the activities of SDOs; and joint planning with SDOs to identify needed standards).
141. See McINTYRE & MooRE, supra note 59, at 7 fig.4.2 (charting the number of agency
employees participating in private sector standards activities from 1997 through 2004).
142. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-10 (1946) (determining that a
company-owned town may be treated as a state actor for purposes of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and therefore, that the town must allow a Jehovah's Witness to distribute
religious pamphlets on the sidewalks of the town).
143. See id. (determining that a company-owned town may be treated as a state actor for
purposes of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (finding that a private association
incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary
schools can be considered a state actor for First and Fourteenth Amendment purposes); Lebron
v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (finding Amtrak, a private corporation
formed by federal statute, to be a state actor for First Amendment purposes).
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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2. The State Actor Test
Since the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,45 courts have held that an
"[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment."' 46 The general rule, then, is that a private actor is
not limited by the protections guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court, however, has occasionally treated private actors as state actors
and held them liable for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 For
example, in Marsh v. Alabama,148 the Supreme Court found that a company
owned town had to respect the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a
Jehovah's Witness to distribute religious pamphlets because "the town... does
not function differently from any other town."' 49 The Court focused on the
overwhelming similarity between the company town and a public town in
coming to its conclusion. 50 The Supreme Court later summarized the rule of
Marsh: If a private party is "performing the full spectrum of municipal powers
and [stands] in the shoes of the State," that private party will be liable for
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
5'
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has relaxed this "full spectrum"
test. In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass 'n,52
145. Civil Rights Cases of 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to private action).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291 (finding that a private association
incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary
schools can be considered a state actor for First and Fourteenth Amendment purposes); West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988) (holding that a physician hired as a private contractor in a prison
can be a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which grants a right of action against any
person who, under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff of any constitutional right). But see
Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (declining to extend the right of action
first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to
allow recovery against a private corporation).
148. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-10 (1946) (finding that a company-owned
town, because it functioned no differently from any other town, had to allow a Jehovah's
Witness to freely distribute pamphlets in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment).
149. Id. at 508.
150. See id. at 502-03 (discussing the similarities between the company town and "any
other American town").
151. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
152. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290
(2001) (finding that a private association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic
competition among public and private secondary schools can be considered a state actor for
First Amendment purposes). In Brentwood, the Court addressed the issue of whether the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) was a state actor for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 290. The Association was a not-for-profit corporation
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the Court found sufficient "entwinement of public institutions and public
officials" in the composition and workings of the private athletic association to
treat the association as a state actor.' 53 In Brentwood, almost every public high
school in Tennessee was a member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association (the Association), and public high school principals made up 84%
of the Association's membership. 154 The Association received the majority of
its funding from ticket receipts at athletic events in which the member schools
competed, often in public arenas rented by the Association, and from
membership dues. 5 The entwinement of SDOs and government agencies
normally does not rise to the level found in Brentwood, but in this "necessarily
fact-bound inquiry," 56 a court could treat an SDO as a state actor, especially if
the SDO has a large percentage of agency participants and is receiving a large
amount of federal money.
1 57
3. Do SDOs Qualify As State Actors?
Although the OMB Circular instructs agencies generally to give no more
money and have no more representation on an SDO than any other participant,
the Circular also permits an agency to ignore this limit "when it is in the direct
and predominant interest of the Government to develop or revise a standard,
organized to regulate interscholastic sports among Tennessee public and private high schools.
Id. at 291. Almost all of Tennessee's public high schools were Association members, making
up 84% of the Association's voting membership. Id. Public and private school principals,
assistant principals, and superintendents made up the voting membership of the Association. Id.
The Association received the bulk of its funding from gate receipts, but also collected dues from
member schools. Id. It set membership standards and student eligibility rules and had the
power to penalize any violations of its rules. Id. at 292. The Association punished member
Brentwood Academy, a private parochial high school, for violating a recruiting rule, and
Brentwood responded by suing the association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 293. The Supreme Court stated that state action
could be found if "there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that
seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."' Id. at 295 (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,349 (1974)). The Court found that the Association
was a public actor because the public school officials "overwhelmingly perform all but the
purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practical terms." Id. at
300.
153. Id. at 298.
154. Id. at 291.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
157. But see Freeman, supra note 75, at 1304-05 ("Though the Supreme Court
occasionally treats private actors as state actors for constitutional purposes, these instances are
few.").
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and its timely development or revision appears unlikely in the absence of such
support."' 58 The Circular also does not prohibit agency representatives from
serving as chairpersons of SDOs. 159 The Circular, therefore, sets no hard limits
on the ability of a government agency to participate and influence an SDO. To
date, no court has been tasked with deciding whether an SDO qualifies as a
state actor. One can conceive, however, of an SDO so reliant on an agency's
money and so entwined with agency personnel that it resembles Brentwood's
Association more than the private, not-for-profit organization envisioned in the
NTTAA.16
0
B. Does the NTTAA Violate Nondelegation Principles?
The NTTAA encourages government agencies to use standards developed
by private SDOs.161 The Act thus delegates a public function-creating
standards for public use-to private parties. 162 Courts fear such a delegation
for several reasons. When an agency delegates power to a private party, "lines
of accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic check on
government decision-making." 163 Additionally, delegation to a private party
"increases the risk that these parties will not share the agency's 'national vision
and perspective."' 164 Scholars and courts fear that the private party, whose
motivations and goals are inherently selfish, will not work to achieve the
federal government's public-minded agenda.
158. See OMB Circular A- 119, supra note 31, at 8556 (addressing the general principles
that apply to agency support of SDOs).
159. See id. ("Active participation includes full involvement in discussions and technical
debates, registering of opinions and, if selected, serving as chairpersons or in other official
capacities.").
160. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). For
another case in which the Supreme Court found a nominally private organization to be a public
actor for constitutional issues, see Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,
400 (1995).
161. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(l), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)) ("[A]ll Federal
agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies .... ).
162. See Verkuil, supra note 112, at 433 ("Both state legislatures and Congress delegate
authority to these groups to formulate standards. These privately produced standards are then
incorporated directly into law.").
163. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
164. Id. at 565-66 (quoting Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7,
20 (D.D.C. 1999)).
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1. Implications of Violating Nondelegation Principles
Nondelegation principles "seek[] to cure the unchecked transfer of
legislative power to the executive. ', 165 The Supreme Court has called improper
delegation of legislative power to a private party "legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form." 166 If a court found that Congress, through the NTTAA,
improperly delegated legislative power to an SDO, it could hold the NTTAA in
violation of Article I of the Constitution. 1
67
2. The Nondelegation Test
A delegation of power from a government body to a private party must
have two characteristics to avoid violating nondelegation principles: an
intelligible principle and ultimate federal control. Generally, "Congress has
wide discretion to delegate functions to both public and private actors."'168
While "case law strongly suggests that subdelegations to [nongovernmental]
parties are assumed to be improper absent an affirmative showing of
congressional authorization," 169 the Nondelegation Doctrine will not limit
Congress as long as Congress provides an "intelligible principle" that the
private actor must follow.1
70
165. Verkuil, supra note 112, at 433.
166. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) ("This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official
body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.").
167. See id. at 297,311 (finding that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which gave a
private coal board the ability to set wages binding on all coal operators, violated Article I of the
Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
168. Freeman, supra note 75, at 1304.
169. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The
presumption that subdelegations are valid absent a showing of contrary congressional intent
applies only to [subordinate federal agencies]. There is no such presumption covering
subdelegations to outside parties.").
170. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.").
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Additionally, in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 17 1 the Supreme
Court held that Congress does not unconstitutionally delegate its lawmaking
authority to a private party as long as the federal government retains authority,
in the end, to create the law. 72 The Sunshine Anthracite Court addressed the
constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937. The Act
set up a Coal Commission, a federal agency, to regulate the sale and
distribution of bituminous coal across the country. The agency was to work
with coal producers, whom the act organized into the Bituminous Coal Code.
The Code was to help the Commission set prices for bituminous coal. The
plaintiff claimed that the Act unconstitutionally delegated price-setting
authority to a private party. The court disagreed, finding no improper
delegation of legislative authority:
The members of the code function subordinately to the Commission. It, not
the code authorities, determines the prices. And [the Commission] has
authority and surveillance over the activities of these authorities. Since
law-making is not entrusted to the industry, this statutory scheme is
unquestionably valid. 1
73
For the NTTAA to avoid the nondelegation problems, Congress must have
given an intelligible principle for agencies to follow and agencies must retain
ultimate control over the final form of the standard.
3. Application of the Nondelegation Test to the NTTAA
The NTTAA appears to pass both prongs of the nondelegation test. The
NTTAA provides a sufficient intelligible principle and gives congressional
authorization by demanding that "all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies.' 74 Also, under the NTTAA, a government agency has the
option to reject an SDO's standard and instead create its own. 175 This ultimate
171. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398-400 (1940)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937 by finding
that Congress did not improperly delegate its lawmaking authority to the National Bituminous
Coal Commission).
172. See id. at 398-99 (finding that Congress may delegate authority for setting prices for
coal to the National Bituminous Coal Commission as long as the Commission, and not
representatives of the coal industry advising the Commission, determined the prices).
173. Id. at 399.
174. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(1), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)).
175. Id. § 12(d)(3), 110 Stat. at 783 ("Ifcompliance with paragraph (1) ofthis subsection is
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control demonstrates that the NTTAA's scheme is not an improper delegation
of legislative authority under the Sunshine Anthracite test because an SDO does
not legislate. Instead, federal bodies adopt SDOs' standards. There is little
danger, then, that under the current nondelegation tests a court would find the
structure laid out by the NTTAA to violate the Nondelegation Doctrine. Some
scholars, however, have questioned how free an agency is to reject an SDO's
standard. 
176
4. Analysis of the NTTAA and Nondelegation Principles: How Free Are
Agencies to Create Their Own Standards in Lieu of SDOs' Standards?
Although the NTTAA's language gives an agency the power to create its
own standard in lieu of an SDO's, 177 the political pressures to cut costs and
employ SDO standards are significant. The OMB Circular emphasizes that it is
the federal government's policy to rely on voluntary standards, 178 and if an
agency chooses to create its own standard rather than using an SDO's standard,
the head of that agency must explain the agency's reasons for doing so in
writing to the OMB. 179 In addition, an industry may exert political pressure on
agencies to adopt certain standards: "The more financially valuable it is for an
industry ... to defend the standards that they write, the more money they will
invest in political donations, lobbying, and legal strategies to protect their
interests."
180
As agencies become increasingly reliant upon SDOs for standards,
developing their own standards will become more burdensome and costly.' 8 '
inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical, a Federal agency or department may
elect to use technical standards that are not developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies .... ").
176. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 67, at 411 (arguing that reliance on privately generated
standards hinders an agency's freedom to reject an SDO's standard and its ability to develop a
standard for itself).
177. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act § 12(d)(3), 110 Stat. at 783 ("If
compliance with paragraph (1) of this subsection is inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical, a Federal agency or department may elect to use technical standards that
are not developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies .... ").
178. See OMB Circular A-i 19, supra note 31, at 8546 ("[T]he policy of the federal
government... [is to] rely on voluntary standards.").
179. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act § 12(d)(3), 110 Stat. at 783
(stating that, if an agency chooses not to use an SDO standard, the head of that agency must
explain in writing to the OMB the agency's reasons for not using the voluntary standard).
180. Shapiro, supra note 67, at 411.
181. See id. (arguing that reliance on privately generated standards hinders an agency's
ability to develop a standard for itself).
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One of the main purposes of the NTTAA was to decrease costs.1 2
Unfortunately, one result of the slashed budget may be a dependence on private
standards. As agencies create fewer standards, they will employ fewer
technical experts, and the experts they do employ will have less experience
creating standards than experts in the private sector. 8 3 An agency that has
successfully cut its costs by turning to SDOs, therefore, may have cut its budget
to the point that it is unable to turn away from the SDOs and produce its own
useful technical standards.'
84
5. Consequences of Congress Delegating Standards-Setting Duties to SDOs
Congress, by enacting the NTTAA, acknowledged the efficiency and
expertise of industry. 185 This preference for private standards over agency-
developed standards is an implicit acknowledgement by Congress of the
inefficiency and lack of expertise of government agencies.186  Such an
acknowledgment is ironic because Congress's original reason for delegating
legislative power to agencies was its hope that agencies would be efficient and
expert bodies. 87 Congress wants to employ SDOs because they can produce
standards quicker and cheaper than agencies. Agencies are slow-acting,
bureaucratic machines because of choices made by judges, Congress, and the
182. See H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 24(1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493,511
("The key challenge is to update domestic standards activities,. . .and to reduce duplication and
waste by effectively integrating the federal government and private sector resources in the
voluntary consensus standards system .... ").
183. See Shapiro, supra note 67, at 411 ("[T]he reliance on privately generated standards
frees an agency from developing the extensive expertise that is necessary to write standards
itself. At the same time, this may mean that the agency lacks the expertise to oversee the
standards-writing process in an effective manner.").
184. See SMrrH & LIPSKY, supra note 89, at 173-75 (describing the "dependence of
government officials on nonprofit agencies").
185. See H.R. REP. No. 104-390, at 24, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 511 ("Playing
an important role in maintaining a future competitiveness edge is the ability to develop
standards which match the speed of the rapidly changing technology of the marketplace."); id. at
31-32, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 518-19 ("'[M]ove the standards and conformity
assessment infrastructures from the public to the private sector, and let the federal government
concentrate on supporting that process through participation, recognition, and harmonization."'
(quoting the testimony of Stephen Oksala, Director of Corporate Standards at Unisys Corp.)).
186. See id. at 24 (stating that protecting the industry-driven nature of domestic standards
activities is an integral part of maintaining the United States's competitive edge).
187. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 110, at 456 (explaining that Congress delegates some
legislative function to agencies because "it usually has recognized that it does not have the time,
the detailed information, or the ability to legislate effectively and knowledgeably on detailed
matters").
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Executive. 188 "Judicial review, mandatory procedures imposed by statute or
judicial order, the executive branch's internal review, and Congress's formal
and informal review have impeded significantly the efficiency of the
rulemaking process."1
89
Through the NTTAA's delegation of standards-setting to SDOs, Congress
is effectively bypassing administrative agencies and all of the government
control that comes with them, in an effort to accelerate and improve the
standards-making process. Congress has strongly encouraged agencies to put
SDOs to work for the federal government, stating "all Federal agencies and
departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a
means to carry out policy objectives or activities."' 190 Under the NTTAA,
agencies are to go beyond simply adopting SDOs' standards. 19' They are to
participate in the decisionmaking of these private entities and use federal funds
to help produce standards for government use. 192 Though Part IV.A of this
Note suggests that SDOs may qualify as state actors, 193 to date no court has
reached that conclusion. As a result, SDOs are not subject to the same rules
and constitutional constraints as agencies, 194 making them an attractive
instrument for Congress.
188. See id. at 458 (stating that all three branches of government have acted to impede the
efficiency of the rulemaking process within agencies).
189. Id.
190. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(1), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 783 ("In carrying out paragraph (1) ... ,Federal agencies
... shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies and shall, when such
participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency and departmental missions,
authorities, priorities, and budget resources, participate with such bodies in the development of
technical standards.").
193. See supra Part IV.B (suggesting that SDOs might qualify as state actors for
constitutional law purposes).
194. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 75, at 1305 (describing the extent to which private
contractors may be exempt from the statutory limits on agencies). Freeman notes:
Beyond constitutional limitations lie statutory imperatives designed to promote
public law norms. Private actors may effectively escape these as well. First, the
APA specifically excludes both grants and contracts from the demands of notice-
and-comment rulemaking normally applicable to federal agencies. Moreover, the
APA subjects only agency action to potential judicial review. As part of their
inherent power, agencies may further delegate powers entrusted to them to other
actors with virtually no constitutional limitation, provided that Congress does not
prohibit them from doing so.
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Although the OMB has declared that agencies should only adopt standards
produced by SDOs that utilize "due process" in their standards-setting
procedure, 95 it is unclear whether any judicial check on an agency exists that
could ensure every standard adopted by an agency came from an SDO utilizing
due process. OMB Circular A-1 19 mentions "due process," and at least one
member of the Senate focused on the process an SDO should use while making
a standard, 96 but the NTTAA itself does not set any requirements as to the
process required of an SDO in producing a standard adopted by a government
agency.197 So far, no case law has questioned the process provided by an SDO
for a standard adopted by an agency under the NTTAA's. However,
Noblecraft Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,' 98 a pre-NTTAA case,
195. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (making due process a definitional
attribute of voluntary consensus standard bodies); see also 142 CONG. REC. S 1078, S 1081 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1996) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) ("This provision is not intended to direct
agencies and departments to consider standards from organizations that do not meet the criteria
of openness, balance of interest, and due process."); Hamilton, supra note 110, at 462-64
(describing and praising the process employed by SDOs).
196. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate deliberations of the
NTrAA).
197. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)).
198. See Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that OSHA properly adopted a national consensus standard for the use of radial saws in
woodworking despite the fact that the sawmill and plywood industries were not represented on
the American National Standards Institute Committee, which formulated the standard). In
Noblecraft, the Ninth Circuit addressed a claim by petitioners, Pacific Northwest sawmill and
plywood industries, that an OSHA standard governing radial saws that was created by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) was not a valid "national consensus standard" as
required by OSHA. Id. at 201. The petitioners claimed that the regulation was invalid because
"the sawmill and plywood industries were not represented on the ANSI committee which
formulated the standard." Id. at 202. The court disagreed, however, pointing out that OSHA
authorized the OSHA Secretary to promulgate any "national consensus standard" as an
occupational safety or health standard without complying with the notice and hearing provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. OSHA defined "national consensus standard" as
any occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) has
been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing
organization under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have
reached substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner
which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies.
Id. The court also pointed out that ANSI's procedures were sufficient to qualify ASNI
standards as consensus standards. Id. It concluded that "Congress... was aware of ANSI's
procedures, and approved the adoption of ANSI standards as national consensus standards." Id.
at 202-03. The standard, even without petitioners' participation, was valid. Id. at 204. The
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suggests that a court will look closely at the language of the NTTAA if the
issue ever arises.199
In Noblecrafi, the Third Circuit held that OSHA properly adopted a
consensus standard for radial saws even though the sawmill and plywood
industries were not represented on the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) committee that formulated the standard.2 00  The court examined
OSHA20' and found a detailed description of the term "national consensus
standard,2 02 which is similar to the definition found today in OMB Circular A-
119.203 The court then looked at the Senate discussion of OSHA and found that
senators stated that any standard developed by ANSI automatically met the
definition of "national consensus standard" under the Act.2°4 The court
concluded that, as long as ANSI developed a standard and the Secretary of
OSHA approved of it, the standard qualified as a proper national consensus
standard for OSHA's purposes.0 5
The Noblecraft case sheds some light on how a court might treat a
standard adopted under the NTTAA. While OSHA provided a detailed
definition of "consensus standard,, 20 6 the NTTAA fails to define the term. The
NTTAA simply states that agencies should adopt SDO standards unless doing
so is "inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical." 20 7 This
court also quickly dismissed petitioners' claim that Congress improperly delegated legislative
and administrative power to a private organization by stating, "OSHA in practice did not
surrender to ANSI all its standard-making function. As was the case here, it selected among the
ANSI standards with apparent discrimination." Id. at 203.
199. See id. at 202 (quoting extensively from OSHA).
200. See id. at 204 (holding that the standard is properly serves as a national consensus
standard).
201. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2000).
202. See id. § 652(9) (defining "national consensus standard" as a consensus standard
promulgated by a nationally-recognized SDO which was formulated to voice diverse views, and
which the Secretary of OSHA deems to be a "national consensus standard").
203. See supra note 73 (quoting the OMB Circular's definition of "voluntary consensus
standards bod[ies]" as bodies that rely on openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals
process, and consensus in promulgating their standards).
204. See Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 614 F.2d 199, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1980)
(quoting the language of the Senators and concluding, "Congress ... was aware of ANSI's
procedures, and approved the adoption of ANSI standards as national consensus standards").
205. See id. at 203 ("The resort by Congress to consensus standards was to meet the
pressing need for adoption of OSHA standards on an exceedingly broad industrial front without
undue delay. The procedures by which consensus standards were formulated were felt to
provide sufficient assurance as to industry-wide consensus ....").
206. See supra note 202 (citing OSHA's definition of "national consensus standard").
207. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
§ 12(d)(3), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)).
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language seems to give agencies complete discretion in their decision to use or
to refrain from using an SDO's standard. As in Noblecraft,208 a court reviewing
an NTTAA standard may look at the OMB Circular's definition of "consensus
standard" or examine the legislative history of the statute to find certain
senators' definitions of"consensus standard., 20 9 Despite providing a definition
of consensus standard, however, the OMB Circular goes on to explicitly deny a
private right of action, 1 ° meaning that a plaintiff probably could not rely on the
Circular's definition in court. In addition to this lack of a right of action, the
language of the NTTAA is much broader than the detailed language of
OSHA. 211 With this broad language, a court may choose to treat the adoption
of an SDO standard as an exercise of agency discretion and decline to find that
action reviewable.212 If courts refuse to consider SDOs as state actors, and if a
private party cannot sue an agency to ensure that due process exists within an
SDO, the only available judicial check on SDOs is antitrust law.
C. The Antitrust Issues of Standards-Setting
Thus far, this Part has discussed how the NTTAA has positioned SDOs in
a slightly less powerful position than the law regulating public bodies. This
subpart will describe how SDOs also exist above the laws regulating private
industry behavior. A complete examination of the complex body of law that
surrounds the antitrust implications of standards-setting is beyond the scope of
this Note.213 To ignore the issue completely, however, is irresponsible. The
208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing how the Noblecraft court
examined the legislative history of OSHA).
209. See supra note 72 (quoting Senator Rockefeller's definition of "consensus standard").
210. See OMB Circular A-119, supra note 31, at 8558 ("This Circular is not intended
to... provide new grounds for judicial review, or create new rights or benefits, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, or its officers or employees.").
211. Compare National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act § 12, 110 Stat. at 783
(generally stating that federal agencies shall use SDO standards unless doing so is impractical),
with Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (2000) (giving a precise definition
for "national consensus standards").
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 70 1(a) (2000) ("This chapter [of the Administrative Procedure Act]
applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (declaring an issue is
committed to agency discretion where the applicable statute is so broad that there is no law to
apply).
213. For an overview of the implications of antitrust law on standards-setting, see ABA
HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 12, at 14-21. This Note is only concerned with
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Supreme Court has found SDOs liable for antitrust violations on at least two
214occasions. Because industry participants collaborate in SDOs, standards
have the potential to "create anticompetitive barriers to market entry, retard
innovation, raise rivals' costs, facilitate collusion, and protect market
position. 2 15  As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]here is no doubt that the
members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a
serious potential for anticompetitive harm."
216
Although standards-setting raises many antitrust issues,21 7 the implication
of government-adopted standards is the core antitrust issue of this Note. In
Parker v. Brown,218 the Supreme Court first outlined the state actor doctrine,
which grants antitrust immunity for actions taken by the state as sovereign.21 9
In Parker, a California raisin producer claimed that the state of California
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act 220 when it imposed an anticompetitive
program on its raisin producers designed to control prices. 22' The Court
determined that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to a state
222actor. Instead, the purpose of the Sherman Act was to "suppress
standards set by SDOs and adopted by government agencies-a topic that accounts for only one
of the five chapters in the ABA handbook.
214. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988)
(affirming jury damages to the plaintiff upon finding that antitrust laws applied to the National
Fire Protection Association and several steel conduit manufacturers violated those antitrust laws
when they recruited over two hundred people to vote against a standard passed at an Association
meeting); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1982)
(affirming jury damages to the plaintiff because the SDO was liable under the antitrust laws for
antitrust violations committed by its agents).
215. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 12, at 2.
216. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500.
217. See ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 12, at 15 (categorizing the
antitrust analysis of standards by their origins: (1) standards set through industry cooperation,
(2) standards set by a firm through unilateral conduct, and (3) standards endorsed by
government action).
218. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (finding activities of the state immune
from antitrust liability).
219. See id. at 352 ("The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no
contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit.").
220. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (prohibiting combinations in
restraint of trade).
221. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344-49.
222. See id. at 351 ("The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain state action of official action directed by a state.").
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combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals
and corporations., 223 In conclusion, the Court stated: "The state in adopting
and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered
into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as
sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government, which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit. 2 24 Since Parker, standards-setting activities
undertaken by state legislatures and state supreme courts have been immune
from Sherman Act liability.
225
The relevant question in an examination of the NTTAA is whether the
Parker doctrine immunizes standards-setting by SDOs when a government
body adopts the standard. Such immunity would allow members of the SDO
more leeway in the means they use to promote or oppose a standard and in the
content of the standards they set. Examining four cases will establish a
framework that will be a useful starting point in determining whether an SDO
has antitrust immunity.
In the first case, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,226 the Supreme Court
addressed a Sherman Act challenge against the State Bar of Arizona brought by
two lawyers.227 The lawyers violated an Arizona law that prohibited lawyer
advertising. The ABA originally formulated the rule, and the Arizona Supreme
Court later adopted it.228 The ABA and the Arizona Bar Association are
SDOs-they are organizations made up of members of an industry that set
standards for that industry. The Court determined that the attorneys' true claim
was against the state itself, the Supreme Court of Arizona as law-maker, not
against the State Bar of Arizona, and therefore concluded that the Parker
doctrine barred the Sherman Act claim.229 The Arizona State Bar, in other
223. Id.
224. Id. at 352.
225. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984) (stating that the Parker
doctrine immunizes a state supreme court's actions from Sherman Act liability).
226. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (finding that the Arizona
State Bar was immune from Sherman Act claims under the Parker doctrine for its enforcement
of a disciplinary rule imposed by the Arizona Supreme Court). The two attorneys violated an
Arizona Supreme Court rule against advertising by placing an advertisement in a local
newspaper. Id. at 355.
227. Id. at 356.
228. See id. at 355, 360 (stating that the disciplinary rule was a rule of the Arizona
Supreme Court and was derived from the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association).
229. See id. at 363 (stating that Parker v. Brown bars the Sherman Act claim).
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words, was immune from antitrust liability because the state, not the Bar, had
caused the attorneys' harm.23°
In the second case, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,23
1
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether economically interested
businesses enjoyed antitrust immunity for their actions meant to influence the
adoption of a standard by an SDO. 232 In Allied Tube, the Court examined the
actions of a producer of steel electrical conduit, Allied Tube, within the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a private SDO.233 The NFPA
writes the National Electric Code, which state and local governments routinely
adopt with few or no changes, making it the most influential electric code in the
nation. 234 Allied Tube, fearing competition from Indian Head, a producer of
new plastic conduit, put together a group of steel interests to vote against
including plastic conduit in the National Electric Code.235 The steel group
"recruited 230 persons to join the [NFPA] and to attend the annual meeting to
vote against the proposal. 2 36 The majority of these 230 had little to no
technical knowledge.237 This packing plan worked, and NFPA excluded the
plastic conduit from the National Electric Code by a four-vote margin.238
After Indian Head filed suit, Allied Tube claimed immunity from antitrust
liability, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.2 3 9 In Noerr, the Supreme Court
230. See id. at 359-60 (categorizing the claim as one against the state).
231. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509-10 (1988)
(holding that "where, as here, an economically interested party exercises decision-making
authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market
participants, that party enjoys no ... immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the
effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace").
232. Id. at 499 ("We granted certiorari to address important issues regarding the application
of... immunity to private standards-setting associations.").
233. Id. at 495-97.
234. See id. at 495 (describing the importance of the code to the electric industry).
235. See id. at 495-96 (outlining the steel conduit producer's plan to exclude plastic
conduit from the National Electric Code).
236. Id. at 496-97.
237. Id. at 497.
238. See id. ("[T]he proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to
390.").
239. See id. at 489 ("The District Court then granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner,
reasoning that Noerr immunity applied because the Association was 'akin to a legislature."'); E.
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (holding
that "where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action,
as opposed to private action," those urging the government to take that action enjoy absolute
immunity from antitrust liability). In Noerr, the Supreme Court addressed a claim by long-
distance trucking companies that twenty-four major railroads and others violated the Sherman
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granted immunity to private parties advocating government action that
eventually results in a restraint on trade, reasoning that the decision to pass the
law ultimately rests with the government, not the private party.240 The Supreme
Court in Allied Tube first concluded that, even though government bodies
routinely adopted the NFPA's standard, the NFPA was not a "quasi-legislative"
body as Allied Tube had argued. 241 The Court then refused to extend Noerr
immunity to Allied Tube's actions upon finding that, despite its political
impact, the context and nature of Allied Tube's activity made the activity
commercial rather than political.242 As a result of this case, the actions of a
member of an SDO engaged in standards-setting may be subject to antitrust
liability if a court finds that the member's actions within the SDO were
commercial and not political.243
Attempting to follow Allied Tube, lower courts evaluating antitrust
challenges in standards-setting cases have tried to distinguish between
situations where the anticompetitive harm has resulted from petitioning
government authorities (subject to Noerr immunity) and situations where the
Act. Id. at 129. The trucking companies claimed that the railroads had conspired to conduct a
publicity campaign against the truckers designed to encourage the adoption of laws destructive
of the trucking industry and creating an attitude of distaste against truckers among the general
public. Id. The Court began by acknowledging that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws," because,
"under our form of government the question whether a law of that kind should pass, or if passed
be enforced, is the responsibility of the appropriate legislative or executive branch of
government so long as the law itself does not violate some provision of the Constitution." Id. at
135-36. The Court then recognized that any time a party attempts to influence legislation
through a publicity campaign, there will be an incidental effect of the campaign that may injure
the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed. Id. at 143. To hold that this
injury makes the campaign itself illegal, the Court reasoned, "would thus be tantamount to
outlawing all such campaigns." Id. at 143-44. The Court concluded that the railroad did not
violate the Sherman Act, even though its campaign had deceived the public and public officials.
Id. at 145.
240. See id. at 136 (granting antitrust immunity to those who attempt to influence the
passage of laws, even if those laws will result in a restraint of trade and arguing that it is the
responsibility of the legislative or of the executive branch to pass laws).
241. See id. at 505 ("We agree with the Court of Appeals that the [NFPA] cannot be treated
as a 'quasi-legislative' body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the [NFPA]
publishes.").
242. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 505 (1988)
("What distinguishes this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the context and nature of
petitioner's activity make it the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity
determined by the antitrust laws themselves.").
243. See id. at 509-10 ("[W]here, as here, an economically interested party exercises
decision-making authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that
comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability
flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace.").
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harm is the result of independent commercial conduct (not immune from
antitrust claims). 244 For example, in the third antitrust case this Note discusses,
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 45 the Third Circuit
addressed an issue that combined both state action and Noerr immunity.246 The
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover (MSL), a law school not accredited
by the ABA, claimed that the ABA violated antitrust laws by denying the
school accreditation, causing the school direct economic damage.247 Although
MSL relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Allied Tube,241 the Third
Circuit distinguished this case from Allied Tube and likened it to Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona by pointing out that, while "states consider the accreditation
decisions of the ABA in their legal education requirement ... every state
retains the final authority to set all the bar admission rules, and individual
applicants or law schools can petition the states for waivers or changes.,
249
States, the court recognized, are "immune from antitrust action under the
244. See ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 12, at 133 ("Following
Allied Tube, lower courts evaluating antitrust challenges to standards-setting activities have
distinguished between situations where the alleged anticompetitive harm flows from the
petitioning of government authorities and situations where the harm results from independent
commercial conduct. Courts generally immunize the former and not the latter.").
245. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026,1036,1038 (3d Cir.
1997) (determining that "[t]o the extent that MSL's alleged injury arises from the inability of its
graduates to take the bar examination in most states, the injury is the result of state action and
thus is immune from antitrust action under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown"). In Massachusetts
School ofLaw, Massachusetts School of Law at Andover (MSL), a law school unaccredited by
the ABA, sued the ABA for antitrust violations, claiming that the denial of accreditation caused
a loss of prestige and a decline in admissions. Id. at 1031-32. In most states, a law student
must have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school in order to sit for the state's bar exam.
Id. at 1035. The court reasoned that MSL's injury was the result of each state's decision, not
the result of the ABA setting accreditation standards. Id. at 1036. The state, the court noted,
was immune from antitrust violations under the Parker doctrine. Id. The court went on to state
that MSL claimed that the ABA injured the school by conducting "a campaign to convey the
idea that ABA accreditation is the sine qua non of quality and that the ABA is the most, or only,
competent organization to judge law schools." Id. at 1037. The court then reasoned that "[t]he
conduct of which MSL complains here is basically the ABA's justification of its accreditation
decisions and MSL is asserting a loss of prestige resulting from it." Id. The court concluded
that "Noerr immunity is proper in this case because the ABA engaged in petitioning activity,
and the stigma injury which MSL suffered was incidental to that activity." Id. at 1038.
246. See id. at 1031-32 (stating MSL's claims).
247. See id. at 1032 ("MSL alleged that enforcement of these anticompetitive criteria led to
the denial of its application for provisional accreditation and caused MSL to suffer a 'loss of
prestige' and direct economic damage in the form of declining enrollments and tuition
revenue.").
248. See supra notes 231-244 and accompanying text (discussing Allied Tube).
249. Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1035.
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doctrine of Parker v. Brown."2 o The court then turned to MSL's claim that the
ABA's denial of accreditation stigmatized the school.25 1 The court concluded
that, because the ABA had spent decades petitioning state governments to
prohibit graduates from unaccredited schools from taking bar examinations,
Noerr immunity was proper in the case because "the stigma injury which MSL
suffered was incidental to that [petitioning] activity.
' 252
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit gave Noerr immunity to a defendant's
deliberate misrepresentation to an SDO in the final antitrust case this Note
considers, Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing, Inc. 253 In Joor,
the defendant, Joor Manufacturing, produced underground storage tanks for
hazardous fluids, while the plaintiff, Sessions Tank Liners, was in the business
of repairing such underground tanks.254 Repairing a leaking tank was cheaper
for a customer than buying a replacement tank.255 Joor's president, Howard
Robbins, feared that Sessions's competition could hurt his business, so he
approached the Western Fire Chiefs Association (WFCA), a body of public
officials that publishes the Uniform Fire Code (UFC), which several local
governments adopt into law.256 Robbins participated in a UFC subcommittee
made up of industry representatives and members of the public.2 57 By using
false and misleading statements, Robbins convinced the subcommittee to ban
the practice of tank repair in the newest edition of the UFC.258 Sessions's
250. Id. at 1036.
251. See id. at 1037 (describing the MSL claim that the ABA has "conducted a campaign to
convey the idea that ABA accreditation is the sine qua non of quality and that the ABA is the
most, or only, competent organization to judge law schools").
252. See id. at 1038 (stating that the ABA had conducted a campaign to keep states from
allowing graduates from unaccredited schools from sitting for the bar and concluding that Noerr
immunity was proper in the case because the stigma injury to MSL was incidental to that
activity).
253. See Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Because the injuries Sessions complains of are the result of governmental action, Joor is
shielded by petitioning immunity from liability under the antitrust laws.").
254. Id. at 296.
255. See id. at 296-97 (stating that, although the price of replacing a tank and the cost of
repairing one are equal, a customer can avoid incidental costs such as interruption of business
by simply repairing a leaky tank).
256. Id.
257. See id. at 297 ("Unlike the UFC Committee and the WFCA, whose memberships were
limited to public officials, UFC subcommittees included industry representatives and members
of the public.").
258. See id. at 297-98 (stating that Robbins "rallied the subcommittee to amend Article 79
to include a provision requiring that leaking storage tanks be removed from the ground" and that
he "knowingly made false statements to the subcommittee").
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business suffered greatly as a result of being excluded from the code.2 59 The
court, like the Third Circuit in Massachusetts School ofLaw, distinguished this
case from Allied Tube:
260
The plaintiff inAllied[Tube] was awarded damages only on the theory that
the stigma of banning the plaintiffs product from a uniform code caused
independent marketplace harm to the plaintiff in jurisdictions that permitted
the use of the plaintiff's products .... In contrast, Sessions has never
proved that it sustained injuries from anything other than the actions of
municipal authorities.
261
The injuries that Sessions complained of were all within jurisdictions that had
adopted the UFC.262 The court then concluded that "[b]ecause the injuries
Sessions complains of are the result of governmental action, Joor is shielded by
petitioning immunity from liability under the antitrust laws.
' 263
Unless a plaintiff can prove that his harm resulted directly from the SDO's
or its members' actions, these four cases establish that a court will tend to
conclude that the injury occurred as a result of government action and therefore
that the plaintiff cannot recover. Exactly how the NTTAA could affect the
decisions in Allied Tube and its progeny is unclear. The line between
commercial and government action is already difficult to define,2 4 and as
government agencies begin to play a more active role within SDOs, that line
becomes even harder to pinpoint. Would the Supreme Court still have found
Allied Tube's actions to be commercial if a government agency had been
participating with the NFPA to produce a standard for agency use, as the
265NTTAA requires, or would it have found Allied Tube to be petitioning in a
259. See id. at 297 ("Fire officials in many localities began denying Sessions's requests for
permits and Sessions's business declined sharply.").
260. See supra notes 231-43 and accompanying text (discussing Allied Tube).
261. Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1999).
262. See id. ("Sessions has not shown that any potential tank lining customer in
jurisdictions that were not enforcing the WFCA tank removal provision decided not to engage
Sessions's services because of the WFCA's adoption of [the UFC].").
263. Id.
264. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,501-02 (1988)
("The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting
from private action may not always be obvious.").
265. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
113, § 12(d)(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272) (instructing
federal agencies to participate with private standards bodies in developing standards for use by
the agencies). The Act states:
In carrying out paragraph (1) of this subsection, Federal agencies and departments
shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies and shall,
when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency and
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political manner similar to Joor? What if the NFPA in Allied Tube had been
working to craft a standard that was "in the direct and predominant interest of
the Government," and the "timely development or revision" of the standard was
"unlikely in the absence of such support? 2 66 In such a situation, OMB Circular
A- 119 authorizes agencies to deviate from restrictions on agency support and to
participate more actively, including giving more financial support, than any
other member of an SDO.267 If an agency was participating in an SDO in such
a way, a court could conclude that the SDO was a "quasi-legislature" and that
the restraints on trade resulting from a participant's actions "were incidental to
a valid effort to influence governmental action" and therefore that the
participant enjoyed Noerr immunity.
268
Massachusetts School of Law and Joor demonstrate a judicial trend
toward finding SDOs immune from antitrust liability. Congress has mirrored
this trend of favoring SDOs by enacting the Standards Development
Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (the SDO Act).269 The SDO Act limits
the liability of SDOs in antitrust suits to the actual damages sustained by the
plaintiff.270 To qualify for this special treatment, an SDO must have
registered with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice,271 and must be setting voluntary consensus standards "that incorporate
departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources, participate with
such bodies in the development of technical standards.
Id.
266. See OMB Circular A-1 19, supra note 31, at 8556 (answering the question, "What are
the general principles that apply to agency support?"). The Circular states:
Normally, the total amount of federal support should be no greater than that of
other participants in that activity, except when it is in the direct and predominant
interest of the Government to develop or revise a standard, and its timely
development or revision appears unlikely in the absence of such support.
Id.
267. See id. (authorizing agencies to deviate from restrictions on agency support of SDOs if
it is in the government's interest).
268. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502 ("Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as
petitioner argues, the exclusion of [plastic conduit] from the Code, and the effect that exclusion
had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influence
governmental action.").
269. See Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-4305 (Supp. V 2005) (limiting the liability of SDOs that incorporate due process to
actual damages).
270. See id. § 213 ("[In any civil action alleging a violation of section 1 or 3 of the
Sherman Act, or alleging a violation of any similar State law.., the amount of damages
recovered by or on behalf of a claimant ... shall not exceed that portion of the actual damages
sustained by such claimant. ").
271. See id. § 107 (stating that an SDO may notify the Federal Trade Commission and the
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the attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process,
and consensus in a manner consistent with the Office of Management and
Budget Circular Number A-1 19.,,272 The SDO Act specifically offers this
leniency only to the organizations, not to their members.273 When the House
Committee on the Judiciary Antitrust Task Force first discussed the Act,
Chairman J. Randy Forbes remarked: "The frequency in which standards
developing organizations are named in lawsuits hampers their efficiency and
effectiveness. ,
274
With less vulnerability to antitrust litigation, SDOs are an even more
attractive instrument for Congress to employ. The traditional legal process
burdened SDOs with liability to antitrust charges, but Congress has relieved
that burden by giving the organizations an elevated status. Judges in the above
cases, and Congress through the SDO Act, have placed SDOs above ordinary
commercial organizations by encouraging limited liability in antitrust cases. As
this Note pointed out in Part IV.A, under existing case law SDOs fall below the
level of state actors and are therefore not subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution. 275 This limbo, above ordinary organizations but below state
actors, cannot endure.
V. Conclusion
SDOs may in fact employ processes that appropriately take into account
conflicting interests276 and respect the ideals of"openness, balance of interests,
due process, an appeals process, and consensus," 277 mentioned in the OMB
Circular A-1 19.278 Part III demonstrated, however, that these internal checks
Attorney General of its standard development activity).
272. Id. § 103.
273. See id. ("[T]he term 'standards development organization' shall not, for purposes of
this Act, include the parties participating in the standards development organization.").
274. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R.
1086 Before the Task Force on Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1
(2003) (statement of J. Randy Forbes, Chairman of the Task Force on Antitrust).
275. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the possibility that SDOs could be state actors but
concluding that, to date, they do not rise to that level).
276. See Hamilton, supra note 110, at 468 ("[T]here is in existence a complex system that
operates effectively in developing regulatory standards through interest participation. This
process often, although not universally, produces acceptable compromises among the conflicting
values that underlie regulatory standards.").
277. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4301(a)(8) (Supp. V 2005).
278. Supra 131 and accompanying text.
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sometimes fail. Reliance upon professionalism alone is inadequate. An
external, formal check is necessary to ensure that SDOs live up to the ideals of
due process they claim to espouse. Unfortunately, Part IV concluded that
currently there is no sufficient third-party check on an SDO's internal
procedure. No court has declared an SDO to be a state actor, and SDOs pass
the nondelegation test. Meanwhile, Congress has taken affirmative steps to
decrease the effectiveness of the only remaining external check on SDOs,
antitrust laws, by passing the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act of 2004. SDOs cannot continue to exist in this legal no-
man's-land: below the legal controls on government bodies and above the laws
that regulate the behavior of private organizations.

